Refolk
ReferenceInterviewing

The Interview Install Request Reference, Each Ask Keyed to What Runs

For any hiring request that runs code on your machine, tell when it executes, run it in a VM, decline it with a script, or report it and clean up.

20 min readLast reviewed November 20, 2026Read as Markdown

Key takeaways

  • A joint advisory from the FBI and its partners reported at least 30,000 devices infected in more than 100 countries through fake job interviews, with the malware disguised as coding tests and video-conferencing software.
  • npm install --ignore-scripts stops preinstall, install, postinstall and prepare scripts, but npm start, npm test and node server still run the app code, so any of them on an unprotected machine counts as an infection.
  • No legitimate interview platform asks you to paste a terminal command to fix your camera, and Sekoia's ClickFake research counted 184 of these fake invitations using 14 company names.
  • VS Code runs folderOpen tasks only in trusted workspaces, and version 1.109 changed task.allowAutomaticTasks to off by default, so older installs and VS Code-compatible editors need to be checked by hand.
  • Refolk's index holds 1,026 Web3-titled developer profiles in India against 523 in the US, a 1.96x gap, so the target pool reaches far beyond the four countries that issued the advisory.
  • If you already ran the code, work from a clean device: disarm the infected machine, revoke sessions and tokens before rotating them, and move any crypto to a wallet created on a clean device.

This reference is for developers in the middle of a hiring loop who have just been asked to clone a repo, run npm install, open a folder in VS Code, download a meeting app, or paste a command to fix a camera. Each request gets one row: what code it runs on your laptop and when, what the legitimate version usually looks like, how to comply safely, and a line that declines without ending the conversation. If you already ran something, the cleanup order is near the end.

What is an interview install request, and why is it the attack?

An interview install request is any hiring-stage ask that makes your own machine run code someone else wrote: a repository, a package, an editor config, an installer, or a pasted command. It matters because a documented campaign uses exactly these requests to deliver malware, and it dresses them up as normal hiring steps.

The FBI's public service announcement I-090324-PSA describes recruiters impersonating employers and then asking targets to run "pre-employment tests" or debugging tasks built on unfamiliar packages, scripts or repositories. A later joint advisory, CSA 260918, published on IC3, describes malware disguised as coding tests or video-conferencing software during fake job interviews. It was issued by the FBI, DC3, Australia's ACSC (part of ASD), Germany's BND and BfV, and Japan's National Police Agency and National Cybersecurity Office. It names the malware families BeaverTail, InvisibleFerret, OtterCookie, OtterCandy and StoatWaffle. MITRE ATT&CK tracks the group as G1052 and records two habits: recruiting targets through LinkedIn, X and Telegram, and writing malicious npm packages.

30,000+
devices infected in the fake-interview campaign described in the joint advisory
Spread across more than 100 countries in about eight months, with more than $10.7 million in stolen crypto moved back to North Korea and over 7,000 wallets drained of funds or credentials.

No single request gives the attack away. The sequence does. The advisory describes interviewers who used AI face-swapping software, switched off their video after a few minutes, and asked the target to do the same, blaming network issues. That turns an ordinary video call into the moment code gets run.

How a fake interview reaches your shell

  1. Contact
    An unsolicited recruiter appears on LinkedIn, X or Telegram, often using a real company's name
  2. Rapport
    Weeks of friendly build-up before any technical ask, matching the FBI PSA pattern
  3. Video
    A face-swapped interviewer turns their camera off "for network issues" and asks you to do the same
  4. Execution ask
    A coding-test repo, a meeting app, or a command to "fix" your camera
  5. Theft
    Environment variables, SSH keys, browser data and wallets leave the machine
Each stage looks like normal hiring, and the request to run code arrives only after trust and a video call have been set up.

Validin describes these steps as built to "blend seamlessly into industry-normal behavior." That is why this reference is organised by request and not by red flag. By the time the request reaches you, the obvious red flags have been designed out.

Who gets these requests: Web3 developer pools in Refolk's index

The advisory says victims were mostly web designers, engineers, and cryptocurrency, blockchain and Web3 specialists. Refolk's index shows that the Web3 pool alone is almost twice as large in India as in the US. If your title says blockchain, smart contract or Solidity, assume you are a target, wherever you live.

MetricUnited StatesIndia
Web3-titled profiles5231,026
Multiple vs US1.0x1.96x
"Blockchain Developer" share (n=25)72%64%
Top employer in sampleWalmart, 7/25Microsoft, 2/25
Top region in sampleSF Bay Area, 9/25Bengaluru, 5/25
1.96x
more Web3-titled developer profiles in India than in the US, in Refolk's index
1,026 profiles against 523, which puts a large target pool outside the four countries that issued the advisory.

How to read these figures:

  • What they prove. Developers with Blockchain, Web3, Smart Contract or Solidity titles are a large, findable population in both countries, and most of them can be found by title alone.
  • What they don't prove. The employer and region shares come from samples of 25, so treat them as indicative. The top US employer being Walmart only shows that Web3 titles also exist outside crypto-native companies.
  • Where they mislead. Filtering the US query to "Senior" returned 0 profiles. That is a tagging gap in seniority labels, not evidence that no senior Web3 developers exist. Being senior does not take you out of the target set.

When does each request actually run code?

Each request runs code at a different moment: during install, when a folder opens, on paste, or on launch. Each blocker covers only its own moment. Knowing which moment you are at tells you which defence still applies.

RequestRuns whenBlockerStill exposed
npm installduring install--ignore-scriptsnpm start/test
Open folder in VS Codeon folder open (trusted only)Restricted Modeafter you click Trust
Camera "fix" commandimmediately on pastenot pastingn/a
npm start / node serveron launchVM onlyeverything reachable

Install-time controls by package manager

A lifecycle script is a command in package.json that the package manager runs automatically at set points, such as before or after install. A plain npm install runs the preinstall, install, postinstall and prepare scripts for the root project and for its dependencies. The controls differ by tool:

Behaviournpmpnpm 10+Yarn 4
Dependency scripts by defaultrunblockedrun
Global off switchignore-scripts=trueignore-scripts=trueenableScripts: false
Per-package allownpm rebuild <pkg>onlyBuiltDependenciesdependenciesMeta
One-off flag--ignore-scripts--ignore-scripts--mode=skip-build

Three details that change the risk:

  • Registry installs and git installs behave differently. A standard registry install such as npm install some-package@1.2.3 does not run that package's prepare script. Git dependencies and local installs do. A take-home repo that pulls a dependency from a git URL gets a prepare hook that a registry package would not.
  • The flag turns off everything. It also disables the project's own prepare, which is how tools like Husky install git hooks. The setup will look "broken," and that is expected.
  • Allowlists exist. The OWASP NPM Security Cheat Sheet points to @lavamoat/allow-scripts for allowing scripts per package rather than all at once.

What these sources do not settle: whether Python build hooks run during pip install on an unknown project, and whether a plain git clone runs any hooks. Neither is established in the material behind this reference. Check the pip and git documentation for the versions you have installed before you assume either one is safe.

What is reachable when it runs

What gets stolen depends on what the process can see. A process started from your normal terminal inherits your whole session.

What malicious take-home code can reach

  1. Shell environment
    GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS_*, NPM_TOKEN, OpenAI and other API keys, SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  2. Home directory
    .env, .ssh, .config, and anything named wallet or secret, which one sample scans for
  3. Browsers
    Saved sessions and stored credentials, a named target
  4. Desktop wallets
    Exodus, Electrum, Atomic Wallet and Guarda, all named in the analyses
A container that inherits your shell environment or SSH agent still exposes the top layer, so it is not a sandbox.

The advisory says to run unknown code only inside a sandbox or virtual machine. No published minimum spec for a safe container exists in these sources. The working test is simple: none of the four layers above should be present inside the environment.

The request reference: one row per ask

Find your request, read its four fields, and act. Each row lists what runs, how the legitimate version usually arrives, the safe way to comply, and a line you can send.

Comply, sandbox, verify, or walk

Verified on the careers domainUnverified channel
Verified and hosted
Comply, as this is the normal shape of an assessment
Verified and local
Comply only in a VM, with scripts off and after inspection
Unverified and hosted
Check the link's domain before joining or entering anything
Unverified and local
Decline, keep the evidence, and report
Hosted in a browserRuns on your machine
Two questions settle most requests: whether the person checks out on the employer's own domain, and whether the task runs in a browser or on your machine.

Clone a repository

  • What runs: These sources don't establish whether a clone alone runs anything. The documented danger starts when an editor or package manager touches the files.
  • Legit version: A hosted browser IDE. With CoderPad, candidates don't install an IDE, clone a repository, or troubleshoot a local environment. Local take-homes are also a standard part of hiring, but no published standard says how real employers deliver them.
  • Safe way: Clone inside the VM and read the files with cat or less before anything else touches them.
  • Line: "Happy to do it. Is there a hosted version, or should I review the repo in an isolated environment first?"

Run npm install, pnpm install, or yarn

  • What runs: Lifecycle scripts for the project and every dependency, plus prepare for git and local dependencies. Typosquatting is common: one wave used 35 typosquatted npm packages published from 24 throwaway accounts, and npm carries about 90% of all detected open source malware.
  • Legit version: A hosted IDE where the dependencies are already installed.
  • Safe way: In the VM, install with --ignore-scripts or your tool's equivalent from the table above.
  • Line: "I install with scripts disabled and inside a VM during interviews. Is there anything in the setup that needs a postinstall step?"

Start the app or run the tests

  • What runs: All the application code. One incident write-up lists "Ran npm start, npm run dev or node server" as infected, whatever happened at install time.
  • Legit version: The same task in a hosted IDE, or a local repo from a verified employer.
  • Safe way: Read the entry file first, and launch only inside the VM.
  • Line: "I'll run it in my isolated environment and share the output."

Open the folder in VS Code or a compatible editor

  • What runs: Tasks in .vscode/tasks.json set to run on folderOpen, but only in a trusted workspace. VS Code 1.109 changed task.allowAutomaticTasks to off by default, which prompts once with Allow or Disallow. Older write-ups describe an "auto" default, and VS Code-compatible editors still read tasks.json.
  • Legit version: No one legitimate needs you to trust a folder before the work starts.
  • Safe way: Read .vscode/ with cat first, open the folder in Restricted Mode, and don't click Trust.
  • Line: No line needed. This one is fully in your control.

Download a meeting app or "interview client"

  • What runs: An installer running with your user rights. The advisory names malware disguised as video-conferencing software. JFrog's analysis found a camera-driver lure still active, served as an MSI, a macOS zip and a .deb.
  • Legit version: A browser link on a known video or hosted interview service.
  • Safe way: Don't install it. Ask for a browser link.
  • Line: "I can't install software for interviews. Could you send a browser link instead?"

Paste a command to fix your camera or microphone

  • What runs: The command, the instant you press Enter. In Sekoia's ClickFake research, the victim is first told to type cmd.exe into the Win+R box. Sekoia counted 184 invitations using 14 company names, and the lure imitated Willo, a real hosted video-interview service.
  • Legit version: None exists.
  • Safe way: None exists.
  • Line: "I won't run terminal commands during a call. Happy to continue audio-only or join from a browser link on your company domain."

Install a wallet or browser extension

  • What runs: Code with access to your browser. These sources don't document this as a specific interview request. They do name browsers and desktop wallets as the main theft targets, with over 7,000 wallets affected.
  • Legit version: Not documented.
  • Safe way: If the role really involves wallet work, use a fresh browser profile inside the VM and a new, empty wallet. Never use your own.
  • Line: "I'll test that in a clean VM with a throwaway wallet, not my own browser."

Move the conversation to Telegram or Discord

  • What runs: Nothing directly. MITRE lists Telegram as a recruiting channel for G1052. Discord is not established publicly as a named indicator.
  • Legit version: Recruiters who write from the employer's email domain and whose roles appear on its careers site.
  • Safe way: Save the original platform thread before you move anywhere, and verify the person before you take any technical ask.
  • Line: "I'd rather keep this on email. What's your address on the company domain?"

Run the test on your work laptop

  • What runs: Whatever the other rows run, with your current employer's tokens, cloud credentials and SSH agent in the environment.
  • Legit version: No employer should expect a candidate to use another company's managed machine.
  • Safe way: Never. Use a VM on a personal machine.
  • Line: "My work laptop is managed by my employer, so I'll use a separate environment."

How to handle any install request, step by step

Classify the request, verify the person, ask for a hosted version, inspect without running anything, then run it only where nothing worth stealing exists. Each step has a clear finish line, so you can stop at the first one that settles the question.

From request to a safe outcome

  1. Classify the request
    Match the ask to its row above and note when its code would run. Done when you know the row.
  2. Verify the channel and the person
    Compare against the FBI PSA pattern of unsolicited contact, a company site that looks wrong, and long rapport. Done when the recruiter or role is confirmed on the employer's own careers domain or staff listing.
  3. Ask for a hosted alternative
    Ask in writing for a CoderPad, HackerRank or CodeSignal session. Done when you have the link, or the refusal in writing.
  4. Inspect without executing
    Read .vscode/ with cat or less, read the scripts in package.json, and run file on every asset. Done when you have found no folderOpen tasks, no curl piped to sh, and no font file that is really a script.
  5. Harden the editor
    Turn on Workspace Trust, set task.allowAutomaticTasks to off, check your version, and prune broad trusted parent folders. Done when the repo opens in Restricted Mode.
  6. Run in a VM with --ignore-scripts
    Use a VM or sandbox with no tokens, keys, wallets or browser sessions inside. Done when the code runs with nothing reachable.
  7. Decline or report
    Send the refusal line, then report to the platform, the repo host, and IC3. Done when the reports are filed and screenshots are saved.
  8. If you already ran it, disarm then rotate
    Disconnect, move to a clean device, disarm, then revoke before rotating. Done when every credential on the cleanup list has been replaced.

On step 2: the real posting is worth more than a yes or no. If the role exists on the employer's careers domain, that is the document to apply against, and Refolk can score your fit against that exact posting before you spend an evening on a take-home. If no real posting exists, you have your answer.

On step 5: one published audit of Workspace Trust settings across VS Code and Cursor ran to 13 steps and about 45 minutes. Do it once, before you need it, not halfway through a loop.

Copy these inspection commands into the VM. The paths are examples, so adjust them to the repo.

Read-before-run inspection commands
# 1. Editor auto-run config: look for "runOn": "folderOpen"
cat .vscode/tasks.json
cat .vscode/settings.json

# 2. Lifecycle and launch scripts: preinstall, install, postinstall, prepare, start, test
less package.json

# 3. Assets that claim to be fonts or images: anything reporting as text or script is a payload
file assets/fonts/*
file public/*

# 4. Only after 1 to 3 are clean, and only in the VM
npm install --ignore-scripts

Run inside the VM, before any editor or package manager touches the folder. Change asset paths to match the repo.

When the answer is no, this message asks for a safer format without accusing anyone.

Hosted-alternative request
Hi [name],

Thanks for sending the exercise, I'm keen to do it.

During hiring processes I don't run unreviewed code, installers or terminal commands on my own machine. Could you send this as a hosted session on CoderPad, HackerRank, CodeSignal or a similar tool?

If it has to run locally, could you point me to the role on [company] careers page and reply from your company email? I'll then run the repo in an isolated VM and share my results the same way.

Thanks,
[your name]

Send in writing on the original platform so the reply is on record. Replace the bracketed parts.

How this goes wrong: false comforts and false positives

Most infections happen to careful people who trusted one defence too far. Each item below names the belief, why it fails, and what to check.

  1. "--ignore-scripts makes it safe." The flag stops install-time scripts only. npm start, npm test and npm run dev still run the app, and the app itself can be the malware. Check: read the entry file before launching, and launch only inside a VM.
  2. "Restricted Mode is on." It stops applying the moment you trust the folder, and a parent folder you trusted months ago passes that trust down. VS Code-compatible editors still read .vscode/tasks.json. Check: open Manage Workspace Trust and audit every entry.
  3. "The company is real." Sekoia found 14 company names reused as lures across 184 invitations. A real brand is not the same as a real recruiter. Check: find the role on the employer's own careers domain, not on a link the recruiter sent.
  4. "The camera check is on a hosted interview site." ClickFake imitated Willo, a real hosted video-interview service. Check: no legitimate platform asks you to paste a terminal command, so the request settles it whatever the page looks like.
  5. "I saw the interviewer on video." The advisory describes face-swapped video followed by cameras going off. Check: verify identity through a separate channel, such as the employer's published contact route.
  6. "The repo has no scripts." A malicious dependency can sit deep in the tree, and the payload can hide in a "font" file that is really a script. Check: run file on every asset, and remember that a registry install skips prepare while a git dependency does not.
  7. Rotating secrets on the infected machine. New credentials typed into a compromised machine go straight to the attacker. Check: rotate from a clean device, revoke before rotating, and disarm watcher malware first.
A real brand is not a real recruiter, and a face on video is not proof of a person.

The editor default deserves its own warning. VS Code changed the automatic-tasks default in version 1.109, so older installs, and any fork that has not picked up the change, may still run folderOpen tasks with less friction. Advice that skips the version check is out of date for part of this audience.

If you already ran it: the cleanup order

Disconnect first, then do everything else from a device you know is clean: disarm, revoke, rotate, and move funds. One incident playbook puts the developer-side containment work within the first hour.

  1. Disconnect the affected machine from the network. Don't log into anything new on it.
  2. Switch to a known-clean device for every step after this one.
  3. Disarm before revoking. For the Shai-Hulud malware family, one write-up warns that the malware watches your GitHub token for revocation, so the machine has to be dealt with first.
  4. Revoke active sessions and tokens: source control, the npm registry, cloud consoles, AI API keys.
  5. Rotate passwords, source-control tokens, SSH keys, cloud credentials and API keys.
  6. Move crypto to a new wallet created on the clean device. Never reuse a seed phrase that was on the infected machine.
  7. Report the incident, using the channels in the next section.

Which variant you have is usually not obvious from the inside. If you can't tell, assume the cautious order and get help from your employer's security team if a work credential was ever on that machine.

Where to report it, and how to keep this reference current

Report the recruiter account to the platform where it contacted you, the repository to its host, any malicious package to its registry, and the incident to IC3 if you are in the US. Then re-check the version-dependent rows on this page every few months, because editor and package-manager defaults change.

Reporting channels:

  • Recruitment platform: report the recruiter account through the platform's own reporting flow.
  • Repository host: Bitbucket lets visitors report malware and abuse directly while viewing a repository. These sources don't verify the exact GitHub abuse-form address, so use the report option on the repository or profile page.
  • Package registry: report malicious packages through the registry's own process. The exact npm form address is not verified here.
  • Law enforcement: in the US, file at https://www.ic3.gov.

Keeping this reference current:

  • Editor defaults. Check your VS Code version and the current task.allowAutomaticTasks value in the official Tasks documentation. Do the same for any fork you use.
  • Package managers. Defaults change between major versions, as pnpm 10 did by blocking dependency scripts. Check the docs for the version you have installed.
  • Lure formats. The camera-driver lure has been seen as Windows, macOS and Linux installers. Re-read the latest advisory on IC3 and MITRE's G1052 page for new techniques.

A declined fake loop costs you nothing except time, and that time is easier to give up when real applications keep moving. While you wait on verifications, Refolk can keep tailoring your resume and cover letter to the postings you have confirmed on employers' own careers domains.

title: Before you run, decline, or close out a request
item: I matched the request to its row and know when its code would run
item: I found the recruiter or the role on the employer's own careers domain or staff listing
item: I asked in writing for a hosted alternative and saved the reply
item: I read .vscode/ and package.json with cat or less before any editor opened the folder
item: I ran file on every asset and none of the font or image files reported as a script
item: My editor version is checked, task.allowAutomaticTasks is off, and no broad parent folder is trusted
item: The VM or sandbox has no tokens, SSH agent, browser sessions or wallets inside it
item: I did not paste any command given to me during a call
item: Any failed verification was reported to the platform, the repo host, and IC3 where it applies

Questions job seekers ask

Is it safe to run a take-home test repo a recruiter sent me?

Only once you have verified the recruiter through the employer's own careers domain, and even then only inside a VM that holds no credentials. Take-home assessments are standard in real hiring, but the FBI has warned about fake recruiters who ask targets to run pre-employment tests built on unfamiliar packages and repositories. Read .vscode/ and package.json first, install with --ignore-scripts, and treat npm start or npm test as the moment the code really runs.

The interviewer says my camera isn't working and asks me to paste a command. What do I do?

Do not paste it. No legitimate interview platform asks you to run a terminal command to fix a camera. Sekoia documented this exact lure in its ClickFake research: the victim is told to open Win+R and type cmd.exe, and the lure imitated Willo, a real hosted video-interview service. Offer to carry on audio-only or to join from a browser link on the company's own domain, then report the account.

Does npm install --ignore-scripts make a repo safe to run?

No. It stops the preinstall, install, postinstall and prepare scripts for the project and its dependencies, and that is all it does. npm start, npm test, npm run dev and node server still run whatever code the repo contains, and one incident write-up classes anyone who ran those commands as infected. Use the flag inside a VM, and read the entry file before you launch anything.

Will asking for a hosted coding environment cost me the interview?

There is no published evidence either way, but the ask itself is ordinary. Hosted browser IDEs such as CoderPad, CodeSignal, Codility and HackerEarth exist precisely so candidates don't have to clone repos or set up a local environment. A real employer can send a link or explain in writing why the task has to run locally. A recruiter who gets hostile at the question has told you something useful.

Is it safe to open a repo in VS Code if I don't run anything?

Only if the folder stays untrusted. VS Code can run a task automatically when a folder opens, but automatic tasks never run in an untrusted workspace, and Restricted Mode also blocks the terminal, debugging and AI agents. Once you click Trust, or if a parent folder is already trusted, that protection is gone. Read .vscode/tasks.json with cat before opening, and check your version, because older defaults allowed more.

I already ran the repo. What should I do first?

Disconnect the machine from the network, then do everything else from a separate device you know is clean. Disarm the malware before you revoke anything, because some variants watch your GitHub token and react when it is revoked. Then revoke sessions and tokens, rotate passwords, SSH keys, cloud credentials and API keys, move any crypto to a wallet created on the clean device, and report the incident.

Put this to work

Paste your career in once. Every application after that is written for you.

Drop a resume or a LinkedIn URL. I rank the live openings against it, rewrite the resume and write a cover letter for the best of them, and fill in the employer's form when you press the button. You read, you decide what goes out.

  1. 01Drop your resume

    A PDF or a LinkedIn URL. About a minute, once.

  2. 02I rank the openings

    Every weekday morning, the live catalog scored against your history. Up to 20 worth your time, not two hundred links.

  3. 03Each one is written up

    Resume rewritten for the posting, a cover letter, a fit score. Press send, or let me fill in the form.

  • New matches ranked and written before you are up.
  • Every bullet stays inside what your history supports. Nothing invented.
  • Queued, submitted, interviewing, offer: one screen, not a spreadsheet.

Free, no card. Up to 25 applications sent a week, and nothing is sent until you say so.

Read next